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Abstract. We consider competition between sellers oﬀering similar items
in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual
auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract
buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of
two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that,
rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility
by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own
auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill
bidding introduces ineﬃciences within the market. However, we then go
on to show that these ineﬃciences can be reduced when the mediating
auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from
submitting shill bids.
1 Introduction
Online markets are becoming increasingly prevalent and extend to a wide variety
of areas such as e-commerce, Grid computing, recommender systems, and sensor
networks. To date, much of the existing research has focused on the design and
operation of individual auctions or exchanges for allocating goods and services.
In practice, however, similar items are typically oﬀered by multiple independent
sellers that compete for buyers and set their own terms and conditions (such as
their reserve price and the type and duration of the auction) within an insti-
tution that mediates between buyers and sellers. Examples of such institutions
include eBay, Amazon and Yahoo!, where at any point in time multiple concur-
rent auctions with diﬀerent settings are selling similar objects, often resulting
in strong competition. Given this competition, a key research question is how a
seller should select their auction settings in order to best attract buyers and so
increase their expected proﬁts. In this paper, we consider this issue in terms of
setting the seller’s reserve price (since the role of the reserve price has received
attention in both competitive and non-competitive settings). In particular, we
extend the existing analysis by considering how sellers may improve their proﬁt
by shill bidding (i.e. bidding within their own auction as a means of setting an
implicit reserve price). Moreover, we investigate how the institution can deter
this undesirable shill bidding through the use of appropriate auction fees.
? This is an abbreviated version. The complete paper is published as [1].Fig.1. The competing sellers game.
2 Model of Competing Sellers
The model of competing sellers proceeds in four stages (see ﬁgure 1). First,
the mediator (an institution such as eBay or Yahoo! that runs the auctions) an-
nounces the auction fees to the sellers. The sellers then simultaneously post their
reserve prices in the second stage. In the third stage, the buyers simultaneously
select an auction (or, equivalently, a seller) based on the observed reserve prices.
In the ﬁnal stage, the buyers (and possibly the sellers who are shill bidding)
submit bids and the auctions are executed concurrently.
3 Analysis
A complete analysis of equilibrium behaviour and market eﬃciency for the com-
plete model is intractable [2]. Therefore, in this section, we analyse a simpliﬁed
version with two sellers and no auction fees (in section 4 we address the com-
plete model). We assume that there are N risk neutral buyers, each of whom
requires just one item. Each buyer has valuation v independently drawn from a
commonly known cumulative distribution F with density f and support [0,1].
Each risk neutral seller oﬀers one item for sale, has production costs xi, and
decides upon a reserve price ri and shill bid si. The preferences of buyers and
sellers are described by von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.3.1 Buyer Equilibrium Behaviour
The buyers’ behaviour for two sellers has been analysed in [3]. A rational buyer
with valuation v < r1 will not attend any auction. Furthermore, if r1 < v < r2,
the buyer will always go to seller 1. The interesting case occurs when v > r2.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, there is a unique cut-oﬀ point 1 ≥ w ≥ r2
where buyers with v < w will always go to seller 1, and buyers with v ≥ w
will randomize equally between the two auctions. The cut-oﬀ point w is exactly
where a buyer’s expected utility is equal for both auctions, and is thus found by
solving:
r1F(r1,w)N−1 + (N − 1)
Z w
r1
yF(y,w)N−2dF(y) = r2F(w,w)N−1
where F(y,w) = F(y) + [1 − F(w)]/2. Given the buyers’ cut-oﬀ point, we can
now calculate the sellers’ expected revenue.
3.2 Seller Equilibrium Behaviour
To calculate the equilibrium behaviour of the sellers, we derive a general ex-
pression for the sellers’ expected utility. This is calculated by considering the
probability of one of three events occurring: (i) no bidders having valuations
above the reserve price and the item does not sell, (ii) only one bidder having a
valuation above the reserve price and the item sells at the reserve price, or (iii)
two or more bidders having valuations above the reserve price and the item sells
at a price equal to the second highest valuation. Thus, the expected utility of
seller i who has a production cost of xi and sets a reserve price of ri is
Ui(ri,xi) = N(ri − xi)G(ri)(1 − G(ri))N−1
+ N(N − 1)
Z 1
r1
(xi − y)G0(y)G(y)(1 − G(y))N−2dy (1)
where G(y) is the probability that a bidder is present in the auction and that
this bidder has a valuation greater than y.
Now, in the standard auction with no competing sellers, we have the standard
result that G(y) = 1 − F(y) and G0(y) = −f(y). However, for two competing
sellers, we must account for the fact that the number and valuation of the bidders
in the auction is determined by the bidders’ cut-oﬀ point w. Thus, for sellers 1
and 2 (where seller 1 has the lower reserve price), G1 and G2 are given by:
G1(y) =
(
1+F(w)
2 − F(y) y < w
1−F(y)
2 y ≥ w
G2(y) =
(
1−F(w)
2 y < w
1−F(y)
2 y ≥ w
(2)
Thus, the sellers’ expected utility depends on the reserve price of both sellers
and the equilibrium behaviour is complex. We now apply this result to three
diﬀerent cases: (i) where both sellers declare public reserve prices, (ii) where one
seller declares a public reserve price and the other submits a shill bid, and (iii)where both sellers shill bid1.
Both Sellers Announce Public Reserve Prices. In this case, the equilib-
rium strategy of each seller is given by a Nash equilibrium at which each seller’s
reserve price is a utility maximising best response to the reserve price of the
competing seller. When x1 = x2, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists [3].
However, when the sellers have suﬃciently diﬀerent production costs, we ﬁnd
that a pure Nash equilibrium exists where the reserve price of both sellers is
higher than their production costs. We ﬁnd this equilibrium numerically by it-
eratively discretising the space of possible reserve prices. That is, for all possible
values of r1 and r2 that satisfy the conditions x1 ≤ r1 ≤ 1 and r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1,
we calculate w and hence the expected utility of the two sellers. We then search
these reserve price combinations to ﬁnd the values of r∗
1 and r∗
2 that represents
the utility maximising best responses to one another. By iterating the process
and using a ﬁner discretisation at each stage, we are able to calculate the Nash
equilibrium to any degree of precision. The outcomes show that the symmetric
case is very much a special case, and the majority of possible production cost
combinations yield unique pure strategy Nash equilibria.
One Seller Shill Bids. Rather than announce a public reserve price, either
seller may choose to announce a reserve price of zero to attract bidders, and
then submit a shill bid to prevent the item from selling at too low a price. Thus,
the seller who does not shill bid (seller 2 since r2 will be greater than r1) should
declare a reserve price that is a best response to the zero reserve price announced
by the bidder who does shill bid. This reserve price is simply given by the value
of r2 that maximises U2(r2,x2), given that we calculate G2(y) as in equation 2
and take r1 = 0 in order to calculate w.
Given the best response reserve price of seller 2, and the resulting value of
w, we can also calculate the shill bid that seller 1 should submit in order to
maximise its own expected utility. By substituting s1 for r1 in equation 1, and
using G1(y) as given in equation 2, we ﬁnd the shill bid that maximises U1(s1,x1).
Both Sellers Shill Bid. Finally, when both sellers declare a zero reserve price
and shill bid, the bidders will randomise equally between either auction, since
there is no reserve price information to guide their decision. Thus we ﬁnd the
equilibrium shill bids of both sellers by again substituting si for ri in equation 1
and hence ﬁnding the value of si that maximises Ui(si,xi) when w = 0.
Table 1 shows an example of the resulting four strategy combinations as a normal
form game (in this case N = 10, x1 = 0.25, and x2 = 0.5). Note that both sellers
have a dominant strategy to submit shill bids (this result holds in general in
the absence of auction fees). At this equilibrium, seller 2 achieves its maximum
possible utility. However, seller 1 receives more when neither seller shill bids and
1 When a seller shill bids, the declared reserve price has no additional beneﬁt. Thus we
assume they declare no reserve price (or, equivalently, declare a zero reserve price).Seller 2
RP SB
Seller 1
RP 0.452 , 0.189 0.403 , 0.220
SB 0.457 , 0.188 0.423 , 0.220
Table 1. Sellers’ expected utility when either declaring a reserve price (RP) or to shill
bidding (SB).
is thus better oﬀ with a mechanism that deters all parties from submitting shill
bids.
4 Auction Fees
We now consider auction fees and market eﬃciency in the competing sellers
game. We compare two types of auction fees: a closing price (CP) fee that is
a fraction, β, of the selling price (where β is the CP commission rate), and a
reserve-diﬀerence (RD) fee that is calculated as a fraction, δ, of the diﬀerence
between the selling price and the seller’s declared reserve price, (where δ is the
RD commission rate). The ﬁrst type of fee is the most common in online auctions
such as eBay, Yahoo! and Amazon. The second type of fee was introduced in pre-
vious literature, and is shown to prevent shilling for particular bidder valuation
distributions in a single multi-stage auction [4].
Auction fees add considerable complexity to the analysis of the competing
sellers game since a seller now needs to optimally set both the reserve price and
the shill bid. Therefore, we investigate auction fees using a simulation based on
evolutionary algorithms (EAs). The EA maintains a population of possible seller
strategies, where a strategy determines the shill bid and reserve price for each
auction. At each generation, M seller strategies are randomly selected from the
population and compete against one another in a number of consecutive games.
The ﬁttest strategies survive and are transferred to the next generation, whereas
poor performing strategies are removed from the population. New strategies are
explored by slightly modifying existing individuals using a mutation operator.
This evolutionary process is repeated for a ﬁxed number of iterations.
We now compare auction fees by considering: the shill eﬀect, which is mea-
sured as the diﬀerence that a buyer pays on average with and without shill bids,
and a measure of the relative eﬃciency ηK of an allocation K, where ηK is given
by:
ηK =
PN
i=1 vi(K) +
PM
i=1(xi − xi(K))
PN
i=1 vi(K∗) +
PM
i=1(xi − xi(K∗))
, (3)
where K∗ = argmaxk∈K[
PN
i=1 vi(k) −
PM
i=1 xi(k)] is an eﬃcient allocation, K
is the set of all possible allocations, vi(k) is bidder i’s utility for an allocation
k ∈ K, and xi(k) is seller i’s production costs for a given allocation (in order toprevent a negative value we add production costs xi in both the denominator
and the numerator).
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Fig.2. Evolutionary simulation results demonstrating (a) the shill eﬀect and (b) the
relative eﬃciency η,for closing-price (CP) fees (solid lines) and reserve-diﬀerence (RD)
fees (dashed lines). Results are averaged over 30 runs with randomly set production
costs and the error-bars denote 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The experimental results are shown in ﬁgure 2 for diﬀerent commission rates
and number of sellers. In these experiments, each seller’s production costs are
randomly selected from a uniform distribution with support [0,0.5] at the be-
ginning of each run. In addition, the number of bidders is set to an average of 3
per auction2.
As shown in ﬁgure 2(a), the RD fee is consistently better at reducing the shill
eﬀect, irrespective of the number of sellers. This is because the fee provides an
incentive for lowering the shill bid as well as increasing the reserve price (since
this reduces the diﬀerence between the closing price and reserve price). The CP
fee, on the other hand, is neutral with regards to the reserve price.
By increasing the reserve price buyers can make a more informed decision
about which seller to choose. This is especially important if sellers have diﬀerent
production costs. On the other hand, a higher reserve price may cause ineﬃ-
ciencies if this results in less items being sold. Figure 2(b), however, shows that
both fees increase the market eﬃciency because of the reduced shill bid, and
that the RD fees are more eﬀective (if the RD fees are increased even further,
however, the market becomes less eﬃcient due to the high reserve prices, and
CP fees perform better). The latter occurs because, with RD fees, the sellers’
reserve prices better reﬂect their production costs. This is also conﬁrmed by
other experiments showing that the eﬃciency increase is similar for both fees if
sellers have no production costs (not shown due to space limitation).
2 We note, however, that similar results are obtained with other settings.To conclude, the experiments show that the RD fee is more eﬀective in de-
terring shill bidding and increasing market eﬃciency. These results generalise
beyond the two-seller case, where the increased competition among sellers lowers
the reserve prices and provides additional incentive to shill bid. This is consis-
tent with earlier results showing that RD auction fees can deter shill bidding
for isolated auctions [4]. However, our results show, for the ﬁrst time, that these
fees are also eﬀective for a setting where sellers compete. Moreover, we see that,
when using the RD fee, sellers pay much less to the mediator overall compared
to CP fees. The latter is especially important in a larger setting where multiple
mediating institutions compete to attract sellers.
5 Conclusions
Traditionally, competition among sellers has been ignored when designing auc-
tions and setting auction parameters. However, when faced with competition, we
have shown that auction parameters are important in determining the number
and type of buyers that are attracted to an auction. We have also shown that
such competition provides an incentive for sellers to shill bid, but this can be
avoided by a mediator that applies appropriate auction fees. These results are
particularly relevant for online markets and multi-agent systems, where compe-
tition is strong due to the ease with which a buyer (or a software agent) can
search for particular goods. Thus, in these settings, our results can be used by
sellers seeking to maximise their proﬁt, or alternatively, by the auction institu-
tion itself, who wishes to use appropriate auction fees to deter shill bidding and
thus increase the eﬃciency of the market as a whole.
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